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Abstract 
 
The paper examines how efforts to design a policy regime governed by rules may lead 
on the contrary to recurrent and far-reaching political discretion. Where re-
orientations of policy are formally excluded, as in the ordo-liberal perspective, 
unforeseen situations will typically provoke last-minute unconventional actions, 
whether in the form of temporary exceptions to the existing framework or moves to 
constitute a new one. In order to preserve the ideal of a rule-governed order, such 
actions must be cast as extraordinary measures for exceptional times – as the politics 
of emergency, that is. Whereas modern political thought of various stripes tends to 
defend constitutional rules as the condition of policy discretion, here one sees the 
converse scenario of constitutional discretion pursued in the name of policy rules. 
These themes are elaborated in connection with the ongoing crisis of the European 
Union. 
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Between Rules and Discretion: 
Thoughts on Ordo-liberalism 
 
 
Introduction 
The politics of the Euro crisis, and Germany’s role within it, are commonly 
described in two diverging ways: on the one hand, as displaying new heights 
of executive discretion, on the other, as exhibiting an extreme attachment to the 
imposition of constraining rules.1 How are we to account for these apparently 
contrasting depictions? 
Currently, the most popular interpretation seems to be this: that the 
prominence of rules both in discourse and practice derives from the influence 
of ordo-liberal thought, while the prominence of discretion results from the 
incomplete application of these ideas.2 Ordo-liberalism is the structuring ideal, 
but remains only partially realised. There is at least one further possibility, of 
course, which is that the combination of discretion and rules is itself 
characteristic of ordo-liberalism. On this reading, both rules and extraordinary 
                                                 
 1 See, on the one hand, Fritz Scharpf, “Political Legitimacy in a Non-optimal Currency Area”, in: Sara Hobolt and Olaf Cramme (eds), Democratic Politics in a European Union under Stress, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014), and, on the other, Kalypso Nicolaïdis and Max Watson, “Sharing 
the Eurocrats’ Dream: A Demoicratic Approach to EMU Governance in the Post-crisis Era”, in: Damian Chalmers, Markus Jachtenfuchs and Christian Joerges (eds), The End of the Eurocrats’ 
Dream: Adjusting to European Diversity (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2016), pp. 50-77, 
especially p. 52: “rules now reign supreme”. 2  See, for example, Lars P. Feld, Ekkehard A. Köhler and Daniel Nientiedt, “Ordoliberalism, Pragmatism and the Eurozone Crisis: How the German Tradition Shaped Economic Policy in 
Europe”, CESIFO WORKING PAPER NO. 5368, 2015. 
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measures have their place in the ordo-liberal outlook, and the presence of both 
in the contemporary EU is consistent with the structuring influence of ordo-
liberalism. This is the possibility that I would like to explore here.  
 
The idea of an economic constitution 
If there is a core idea in the ordo-liberal tradition, present in one form or 
another throughout its various incarnations, it is the commitment to a stable 
system of rules for socio-economic activity. Ordnungspolitik evokes an ideal of 
political order in which agents of the state design an enduring framework to 
underpin the functioning of market society.3 As is well known, ordo-liberals 
have typically referred to this framework as an “economic constitution” 
(Wirtschaftsverfassung), drawing on ideas already in circulation by the early 
1900s and fashioning them into the cornerstone of their construction.4 
Adjacent to this concept in the ordo-liberal tradition are a range of more 
abstract ideas informing it, as well as a set of more specific prescriptions. 
Amongst the former is the assumption that the economy forms an integrated 
system, that the market and the state can exist in a complementary relation,5 
and various underlying ethical ideas including the view that fairness requires 
the alignment of risk and responsibility, an emphasis on individual freedom, 
                                                 
 3 For historical and analytical overviews, see David J. Gerber, “Constitutionalizing the Economy: German Neo-liberalism, Competition Law and the ‘New’ Europe”, (1994) 42 The American Journal 
of Comparative Law, pp. 25-84; Viktor J. Vanberg, “The Freiburg School: Walter Eucken and 
Ordoliberalism”, Paper 04/11, 2004 (Freiburg: Walter Eucken Institut); Werner Bonefeld, 
“Freedom and the Strong State: On German Ordoliberalism”, (2012) 17 New Political Economy, pp. 633-56; Thomas Biebricher, “Europe and the Political Philosophy of Neoliberalism”, (2013) 12 
Contemporary Political Theory, pp. 338-75. 4 On the history of the concept before its adoption by Franz Böhm, see Knut Wolfgang Nörr, 
“‘Economic Constitution’: On the Roots of a Legal Concept”, (1994) 11 Journal of Law and Religion, pp. 343-54. 5 That the market-economic and the constitutional are, as one might say, “co-original”; let us set aside the question of whether this interdependence is conceptual or empirical. 
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and a corresponding current of scepticism towards democracy. Amongst the 
more concrete prescriptions are a range of policy commitments, such as the 
endorsement of private ownership, opposition to monopoly power, and the 
central importance ascribed to price stability, as well as evolving views on the 
monetary policies that can foster this and the institutions conducive to 
upholding them in a given time and place.6 The idea of Ordnung expressed in 
an economic constitution mediates all these features of ordo-liberal thought: it 
is a central concept in the tradition, notwithstanding the tradition’s evolution.7 
This commitment is commonly understood to express deep opposition to 
executive discretion, as ordo-liberal thinkers themselves have emphasised. 
Franz Böhm wrote warmly of an “automatically functioning coordination 
system” that would “restrict [the state] to the task of defining the structural 
framework” and “severely limit political discretion”. 8  Walter Eucken, in a 
discussion of monetary policy, evoked the ideal of “rational automatism”.9 
                                                 
 6 See, for example, on competition law, Gerber, note 3 above, pp. 52-3. 7 See Vanberg, note 3 above, p. 6. 8 As Böhm writes: “the individual plans of members of society would be controlled with the help of an automatically functioning coordination system. This would relieve the state of the task of central economic control and would restrict it to the task of defining the structural framework which would preserve and enforce observance of the control laws. Moreover, the role of the state in the overall enforcement of this system would be so constituted that it would severely limit political discretion. If a political decision was taken to adopt such a system, then the rules would be laid down as to: (i) the task of the legislator, (ii) the role and duties of the government and (iii) the principles by which the courts would interpret the law. This system is based upon an instrumental and procedural ‘score’ of a predominantly standard character which has been worked out to the last detail. The margin of discretion given to the autonomous members of society is limited by the peculiarity of their coordinated actions and by the consequent special feature of objective mutual interdependence. The margin of discretion given to persons with political authority is limited by the compulsion to submit to the mechanism of control which is laid down as in a musical score, as a modest – I should like to say both socially and politically harmless – minimum. This minimum, though it leaves many options open to the creative imagination which conforms to the system, nevertheless severely restricts the possibilities of ignoring the score and acting in a manner which does not conform to the system by setting the furies of economic and 
political disaster on the heels of the sinners.” (See Franz Böhm, “Rule of Law in a Market Economy”, in: Alan T. Peacock and Hans Willgerodt (eds), Germany’s Social Market Economy: Origins and 
Evolution, (London: MacMillan, 1989), pp. 62-3 (a translation of Böhm, “Privatrechtsgesellschaft und Marktwirtschaft”, (1966) 17 ORDO Jahrbuch für die Ordnung von Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft, pp. 75-152.) 9 Walter Eucken, Grundsätze der Wirtschaftspolitik, (Reinbek: Rowohlt, 1965), p. 263. 
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Political agents were to operate within sharply demarcated parameters. Partly 
as a function of a technocratic concern for the coherence of economic policy,10 
partly the consequence of fears of state capture by private interests, as, for ordo-
liberals, the point has been to constrain political action with rules. Following a 
foundational moment of adoption – the point at which a market economy, by 
“an explicit and uncompromising decision”, 11  was embraced by the 
community and thereby put beyond further contestation – things were to 
unfold in a closely-constrained fashion. 
To be sure, this was never a model of social order without the state. There is a 
class of initiatives that political agents were expected to engage in – those 
“formal” actions which serve to maintain, to perfect and to update the 
economic constitution. These were to be formal in the sense that they did not 
serve particular economic ends, but established the conditions under which 
such ends could be pursued. They would shape the “framework” of economic 
activity, but not entail efforts to “control the productive process itself”.12 They 
were to be indifferent to the substantive outcomes to which they led, and were 
certainly not to be responsive to public opinion.13 Thus, there was a category 
under which significant state action could be envisaged – but always on behalf 
                                                 
 10 See Walter Eucken in: Peacock and Willgerodt, note 8 above, p. 32. Note also the religious inspiration behind Ordo-liberalism which further promotes the holistic outlook: see Philip Manow, 
“Ordoliberalismus als ökonomische Ordnungstheologie”, (2001) 29 Leviathan, pp. 179-98. 11 Wilhelm Röpke, “Is the German Economic Policy the Right One?”, in: Horst Frierich Wünsch (ed), 
Standard Texts on the Social Market Economy—Two Centuries of Discussion, (Stuttgart-New York: Gustav Fischer, [1950] 1982), p. 39. 12 Eucken 1986 / 1948, p.275. 13 Franz Böhm, Walter Eucken and Hans Großmann-Dörth, “The Ordo Manifesto of 1936”, in: Peacock and Willgerodt, note 8 above, p. 23; see, also, Röpke, note 11 above, on the difference 
between “market-conforming” and “non-conforming” measures. See, also, Michel Foucault, The 
Birth of Biopolitics: Lectures at the Collège de France, 1978-9, (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008), p. 171. 
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of constraining discretion in conformity with the principles of the economic 
constitution.14 
The reluctance with which political agents should consider breaking with the 
principles of their economic system – though also the suggestion that 
sometimes they may have to – was well expressed by Wilhelm Röpke: 
Any emphatic call for a homogeneous national economic policy implies that 
the various segments of this policy (prices, marketing, foreign trade, 
agriculture, money and banking, the capital market, etc.) must correlate with 
each other so as to present a uniform whole rather than various parts 
reciprocally cancelling each other out. […] It seems a cheap argument to 
designate this demand and its concomitant policy ‘doctrinaire’. Naturally, 
economic policy ought to remain flexible in regard to its details and guard 
against the danger of tarring everything with the same brush. A systematic 
consistent policy such as that recommended here does not signify that no 
exceptions should or could be made. Nevertheless, it must at the same time 
always be dominated by the fear that concessions on the crucial points or 
even a series of concessions will militate against the overall system which 
will disrupt it and finally generate further concessions in the direction of 
government controls.15 
The approach chimes well with a conception of the market economy as 
something that, if sufficiently well-ordered, achieves a measure of equilibrium. 
                                                 
 14 It is noticeable that in some of the earliest formulations of these ideas, the scope for legitimate state intervention was drawn quite inclusively. In the proto-Ordoliberal thought of Alexander 
Rüstow, the state is bound in its actions simply by the “laws of the market”: “I think there exists a third type of attitude, which would be the correct and modern mode of production. If we were agreed that every new condition of equilibrium which arose in the normal way was the most appropriate solution even though many frictional losses and disagreeable phases had to be overcome en route, it would seem highly advisable to try to achieve this condition without delay and to reduce to zero the interim period which would otherwise slowly pass until a new and durable set of circumstances could be established – an interim period marked by hopeless struggle, by decline and by distress. That would be interference in precisely the opposite direction to that in which we have hitherto proceeded, i.e. not contrary to the laws of the market but in conformity with them: not to maintain the old situation but to bring about a new one, not to delay the natural course of events but to accelerate it. With this in mind, our recommendation is for a form of liberal 
interventionism under the motto ‘fata volentemducunt, nolentemtrahunt’ [the fates lead the willing 
and drag the unwilling].” Alexander Rüstow, “Liberal Intervention”, in: Wünsch, note 11 above, pp. 184-5. 15 Röpke, note 11 above, p. 38. 
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If one can assume that such an economy does not feature endogenous 
tendencies towards periods of extreme upheaval and unacceptable social costs, 
it may be tenable to conceive good policy as purely “formal” in the sense 
described.16 What, though, if there are destructive forces in the economy that 
threaten moments of great instability and distress? The work of Keynes and 
others has long emphasised the volatile aspects of the market economy – the 
centrality of “confidence”, the problem of “speculation”, and so on. 17  An 
economic model committed to constraining the sphere of state action may 
clearly face a distinctive set of challenges should it ever have to confront these 
more volatile tendencies in the market economy – features all the more visible 
in more recent forms of financial capitalism, where contagion has become a 
thematic problem. 
Moreover, the ordo-liberal policy regime is only ever likely to be applied in a 
world that is not wholly ordo-liberal – where other countries pursue different 
models, that is, or imperfectly execute the same. The context of Ordo-
liberalism’s enactment is likely to be one that, if not outright hostile, is at least 
liable to present frictions. Where rival powers pursue policies that deviate from 
ordo-liberal precepts, an important source of uncertainty is introduced into the 
economic system. How then does the ordo-liberal declared aversion to political 
discretion fare in the context of the pathologies and distortions of a market 
economy, and what options does it leave available in the face of an economic 
shock?18 
                                                 
 16 Leaving aside for now the question of democracy. 17 See John Maynard Keynes, The General Theory of Employment, Interest and Money, (London: MacMillan, 1936), especially Chapter 12. The emphasis is on tendencies that depart from what might be viewed objectively rational – how, for instance, assessments of value involve predictions of how others will assess the same, introducing a degree of uncertainty that detaches behaviour from the economic fundamentals and creates the potential for great fluctuations (see pp. 100 et 
seq.). 18  This is often said to be a weak point of Ordo-liberalism: see Mathias Siems and Gerhard 
Schnyder, “Ordoliberal Lessons for Economic Stability: Different Kinds of Regulation, Not More 
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The question carries added relevance given the prospect that the ordo-liberal 
emphasis on stable rules of policy itself contains the seeds of instability, at least 
when applied in certain settings.19 An accent on strictly “formal” interventions 
alone arguably entails a degree of blindness to contextual variations in 
economic conditions. This may be true cross-spatially, as numerous critics of 
“one-size-fits-all” policy-making in the EU have observed.20 Rules intended to 
be neutral in their treatment of actors always carry the risk of treating unequals 
equally, with difficult implications, both economically and politically. The 
point holds also cross-temporally: an emphasis on a stable policy regime 
inevitably faces the problem of how to adapt to changing conditions. It has long 
been argued that the proliferation of policy rules leads to rigidity, and where 
periodic major shifts in policy are excluded, unforeseen situations will typically 
provoke last-minute unconventional actions. Even if the idea of an economic 
constitution admits the possibility of periodically introducing new rules, it may 
suggest a reluctance to expunge old ones, with similar challenging 
implications. I do not wish to suggest that ordo-liberals are without resources 
to address these questions, but it remains the case that the prospect of 
disequilibrium must be reckoned with for reasons internal as well as external 
to the core commitments of ordo-liberalism. 
 
                                                 
 
Regulation”, (2014) 27 Governance: An International Journal of Policy, Administration, and 
Institutions, pp. 377-396, at 386 & 389, on “doubts about whether a rigid Ordoliberalism can help 
to address severe financial crises”. See, also, the sympathetic analysis in Feld et al., note 2 above, p. 14, where contagion – undiscussed in the founding texts of Ordo-liberalism – is noted to be at the heart of the mismatch between responsibility and liability that Ordo-liberals abhor. 19 Given that ideas are never perfectly instituted in practice, this idea is more an intuition than a testable hypothesis. 20 Christian Joerges, “What is Left of the European Economic Constitution II? From Pyrrhic Victory 
to Cannae Defeat”, in: Poul F. Kjaer and Niklas Olsen (eds), Critical Theories of Crisis in Europe: From 
Weimar to the Euro, (Lanham MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2016), pp. 143-60; Wolfgang Streeck, 
Gekaufte Zeit. Die vertagte Krise des demokratischen Kapitalismus, (Berlin: Suhrkamp Verlag, 2013). 
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The place of the extraordinary in the ordo-liberal tradition 
For the committed Ordo-liberal, clearly one response to difficult times is to 
stand by the existing rules framework. The advice to political agents will be to 
restrict themselves to actions regarded as merely formal, preserving thereby an 
order in which discretion is highly constrained.21 This may be rationalised with 
the idea that more harm than good is done by putting the integrity of the 
framework in question, combined with efforts to downplay the negative 
outcomes arising. 
There are a number of reasons why this response may be unsatisfactory, even 
from within the ordo-liberal outlook. Not only may it involve ignoring high 
socio-economic costs, but it may sit badly with other ordo-liberal 
commitments, including the ethical principle that actors be held responsible for 
their actions (the Haftungsprinzip). Upholding this principle may require 
interventions hard to conceive as merely “formal”: indeed, it may require 
reconfiguring economic relations precisely so as to influence substantive 
outcomes. When mechanisms such as contagion are in play – or simply when 
they cannot be excluded – interventions may need to be targeted at particular 
actors if these wider principles are to be maintained. Clearly, the point is only 
further underlined if one accepts that an ordo-liberal preference for stable rules 
may itself be a contributing factor to economic instability. 
Is there scope then for more radical actions? One possibility is to declare an 
exception to the rules framework, thereby seeking both to uphold the 
framework and to stave off the effects of its dogmatic application.22 This is the 
kind of response implied by Röpke in the passage cited above, and is mirrored 
                                                 
 21 Such a position may in practice look rather similar then to Austrian neo-liberalism and its avowed wariness of all kinds of political intervention in the market. 22 See David M. Woodruff, “Governing by Panic: The Politics of the Eurozone Crisis”, (2016) 44  
Politics & Society, p. 97, on exceptionalism as the implication of Ordo-liberal rule consequentialism. 
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in other more recent ordo-liberal writings.23 Importantly, such a move is likely 
to depend on casting the situation as a wholly exceptional one in which the 
usual constraints on political discretion do not apply. 24  The ordo-liberal 
presumption that the state’s relations with the market can be founded on stable 
rules requires that difficult times be framed as moments of emergency. 
Precisely because the model is so wary of permitting exceptions, the situations 
in which discretionary initiatives are pursued must be cast as exceptional – 
situations in which actions are grounded in necessity. In this way, the ordo-
liberal emphasis on a constitutional framework of policy-making would seem 
to invite the escalation of political rhetoric – a politics of emergency – when 
interventions hard to subsume under the heading of “formal” are pursued. 
A second coherent response from within the ordo-liberal viewpoint is to deny 
that a genuine rules framework is in existence, previous impressions 
notwithstanding, and to assert that it now needs to be established. The present 
generation may be repositioned, in other words, not as the inheritor of an 
economic constitution but as being back at the founding moment when a 
decision for the (ordo-liberal) model is to be taken. As we have noted, ordo-
liberal thought has tended to cast this moment as one of legitimate political 
discretion – the moment of discretion to end discretion. 25  Also a form of 
“extraordinary” politics,26 it is not quite the same as exceptionalism: the rules 
to which it is oriented are those-to-come rather than those already in force. But 
                                                 
 23 See, for example, Viktor J. Vanberg, “Ordnungspolitik, The Freiburg School and the Reason of 
Rules”, (2014) 14 Freiburger Diskussionspapiere zur Ordnungsökonomik, p. 15: “prudence does indeed require us to acknowledge that there may be emergency situations in which we need to 
temporarily disband rules that in ordinary times we consider binding.” 24 For a closer discussion of ideas of exceptionalism and emergency powers in Röpke’s thought, 
see Werner Bonefeld, “Authoritarian Liberalism: From Schmitt via Ordoliberalism to the Euro”, (2016) Critical Sociology, online early. 25 This is how the West German currency reform of 20 June 1948 tends to be portrayed in the ordo-
liberal tradition: see, notably, Ludwig Erhard, “The New Facts”, in: Wünsch, note 11, especially p. 35. 26  Andreas Kalyvas, Democracy and the Politics of the Extraordinary, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008). 
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like the exceptionalist response, it invites the framing of the situation as one of 
urgent necessity. To commit decisively to a new framework of rules generally 
requires viewing the status quo as wholly unsustainable, as a state of disorder 
to be contrasted with the order-to-come. 
It is in the nature of arguments from exception and foundation that they are 
difficult to ward off. Deciding whether a situation warrants extraordinary 
action is clearly a matter of judgement – nothing in the objective nature of the 
circumstances themselves or in the political apparatus that confronts them can 
settle this. A departure from the rules framework is therefore a persistent 
possibility, not one restricted to a particular context. Moreover, as those with a 
privileged vantage-point on political developments, and typically with claims 
to expertise in the socio-economic issues at stake, decision-makers are well 
placed to make this judgement in a way that others may struggle to refute. 
It is worth emphasising in this context that both scenarios of extraordinary 
politics are well in keeping with the technocratic tendency in ordo-liberalism. 
Already in its early formulation by the Freiburg thinkers, the approach was 
consciously conceived as a project to be advanced by the “men of science” of 
law and political economy as those able to stand back from private interests 
and take an objective view of the economic system in all its complexity.27 The 
very idea of an economic constitution, as a project of finding the technical 
means to institutionalise principles taken as agreed and settled, reflects this 
general inspiration. If the ordo-liberal aspiration in times of uncertainty is to 
stick with the existing rules framework, this demands that initiatives be cast as 
simply technical adjustments to existing constitutional commitments (as 
                                                 
 27 See the Ordo-liberal manifesto of 1936, with its explicit aim to combat fatalism and relativism and to renew confidence in what science could achieve (in Peacock and Willgerodt, note 8 above, p. 16 & 21). The position of the Austrian neo-liberals was, of course, quite different, with von Hayek tending to denounce such aspirations as “scientism”. 
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“formal” in the sense described). Standards of democratic political justification, 
involving comparison of competing options and the acknowledgement of 
competing values, are likely to be deliberately eschewed. To the extent, on the 
other hand, that adhering to the rules framework is deemed unfeasible, and the 
ordo-liberal encounter with crisis leads to exceptionalism and/or re-
constitution, the technocratic tendency is again undergirded. Suspending rules, 
as well as adopting new ones as an indivisible package, typically relies on a 
claim to special insight – not just the knowledge of how rules are to be followed, 
but an understanding of the ideas that inform them (the “spirit” of the rules) 
so that the decision to waive them can be presented as authoritative. It is exactly 
in such moves that the claim to expertise is performed. 
I have suggested that the ordo-liberal tradition invites economic situations to 
be approached in a dichotomous fashion: either as part of the “normal” 
conditions which can be handled by the merely formal state interventions 
associated with the economic constitution; or – should such efforts prove 
unworkable – as exceptional situations warranting an extraordinary response 
of some sort. Being strongly committed to a certain understanding of order 
encourages any challenge not easily absorbed within that framework to be cast 
as the threat of far-reaching disorder, to be staved off by radical means. The 
attempt sharply to constrain political discretion heavily paradoxically makes 
thinkable the possibility of far-reaching discretion unconstrained by the usual 
norms of politics and political justification. Missing, we might say, is the third 
position, in which it is recognised that even the best policy regimes will always 
be challenged by difficult situations necessitating discretion (not to mention the 
democratic rationale for change), and that the question is therefore how to 
ensure such situations are not cast as wholly exceptional but rather are handled 
in accordance with political norms. 
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The ordo-liberal emphasis is, one may note, on an economic constitution rather 
than a political constitution structuring the procedures of the polity more 
generally.28 It primarily seeks to constrain the kinds of economic policy that 
political agents can pursue rather than the ways in which they may initiate and 
enforce policy. This is an important distinction, since there is nothing in the 
idea of fidelity to a certain set of economic principles that implies constraints 
on political discretion more generally. Indeed, it may be that a strong 
commitment to upholding rules of policy may invite great latitude in the 
procedures by which this is achieved. The early phases of ordo-liberal thought 
famously emphasised the importance of a strong state that was, as it were, 
(legally) unencumbered to do what (economically) it must – hence the familiar 
depiction of it as tending towards authoritarian liberalism. 29  Even if we 
acknowledge that later iterations of the tradition were more interested in 
questions of an overarching rule of law, 30 it remains true that these larger 
aspects of constitutionalism have been relatively neglected in ordo-liberal 
thought. 
 
Discussion: rules and discretion in the Euro Crisis 
Has the handling of the Euro crisis been consistent with the picture described? 
Certainly we have seen major departures from existing policy regimes pushed 
                                                 
 28 Although the notion of an “economic constitution” looks something like a bid to draw on the prestige of constitutional terminology to describe what is ultimately a policy regime, the distinction is additionally blurred in English by the use of the same word to translate 
(Wirtschafts)verfassung and Grundgesetz. 29 Classically, see Hermann Heller, “Autoritärer Liberalismus”, (1933) 44 Die Neue Rundschau, pp. 289-298; see, also, Dieter Haselbach, Autoritärer Liberalismus und Soziale Marktwirtschaft: 
Gesellschaft und Politik im Ordoliberalismus, (Baden-Baden: Nomos Verlag, 1991). See, also, Bonefeld, note 24 above. 30 See, also, Volker Berghahn and Brigitte Young, “Reflections on Werner Bonefeld’s ‘Freedom and 
the Strong State: One German Ordoliberalism’”, (2013) 18 New Political Economy, pp. 768-78, (contra Werner Bonefeld, note 3 above). 
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through by executive discretion. Some have been defended as temporary 
measures intended to restore short-term stability, such as the European 
Financial Stability Facility. Such instances are consistent with the logic of 
exception: understood as responses to exceptional circumstances, they are 
treated as restorative moves, intended merely to reset the existing rules 
framework. Often their proponents have gone to great lengths to avoid actions 
that might resemble a decisive break with the pre-crisis order – the reluctance 
to approve debt write-offs, or even bail-outs, being a well-known example. 
Other measures on the other hand – the later ones especially – instead look 
rather more like efforts to initiate a substantially new rules-based regime. 
Prominent amongst these are the Fiscal Compact, the Six-Pack and the Two-
Pack. These moves have typically been coupled with the portrayal of the pre-
crisis regime as essentially dysfunctional, as rules-based only in name. 
Emblematic in this respect was the blueprint for the future of the Eurozone 
released by the head of the European Council in 2012, entitled “Towards a 
Genuine Economic and Monetary Union”. 31  Exactly by suggesting that the 
existing rules-order was bogus, its authors invoked the licence needed to wield 
far-reaching discretion in the service of establishing a new one. The creative re-
deployment of EU institutional powers (notably of the Commission), the 
circumvention or compression of national-parliamentary debate, as well as the 
use of extra-EU mechanisms to marginalise the European Parliament, are just 
some of the actions taken to this effect. 
By framing the economic situation as one of emergency, unconventional moves 
at odds both with a commitment to stable rules of policy and with basic 
                                                 
 31 “Towards a Genuine Economic and Monetary Union”, Report by President of the European Council Herman Van Rompuy, 5 December 2012, available at:  http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_Data/docs/pressdata/en/ec/134069.pdf. 
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constitutional norms have been adopted as last-minute responses to urgent 
problems.32 To the extent that these problems are indeed pressing, arguably 
they arise in significant part from a reluctance to confront the pathologies of 
financial capitalism, with structural problems of state capture, speculation and 
contagion overlooked in favour of the localisation of blame and an insistence 
on the avoidance of moral hazard. 33  The new policy regimes arising are 
intended to bind decision-makers more tightly to “responsible” economics by 
giving it the status of a constitutional commitment.34 
In short, using the only justifications that ordo-liberals could accept, 
interventions anathema to their instincts have been employed, to handle 
challenges that their own ideas allowed to develop, with the aim of re-
constituting the economic system to be immune to such threats in future. 
One line of argument treats the actions of the German government in the 
context of the Euro crisis as directly inspired by ordo-liberal thinking. As one 
author puts it, “The crisis initially got worse as a result of too close an 
adherence to ordo-liberalism, and it only started to go away as those same ideas 
were partially deserted”.35 Compelling as this thesis may be, the risk is that it 
overstates the influence of one agent – the German government – in a situation 
characterised by the interplay of multiple agents not always with converging 
                                                 
 32 Jonathan White, “Authority after Emergency Rule”, (2015) 78 Modern Law Review, pp. 585-610, 
idem, “Emergency Europe”, (2015) 63 Political Studies, pp 300-18, and idem, “Politicizing Europe: 
The Challenge of Executive Discretion”, in: Sara Hobolt and Olaf Cramme (eds), Democratic Politics 
in a European Union under Stress, note 1 above, pp. x. 33 See, for example, Matthias Matthijs, “Powerful Rules Governing the Euro: The Perverse Logic of 
German Ideas”, (2016) 23 Journal of European Public Policy, pp. 375-91. 34 On the relevant aspects of the Fiscal Compact, see White, “Authority after Emergency Rule”, note 32 above. 35 See Matthijs, note 35 above, p. 380. See, also, David Schäfer, “A Banking Union of Ideas? The 
Impact of Ordoliberalism and the Vicious Circle on the EU Banking Union”, (2016) 54 Journal of 
Common Market Studies, pp. 961-80, and supporting quotations therein concerning Schäuble’s own Ordo-liberal convictions; see, also, Peter Nedergaard and Holly Snaith, “‘As I Drifted on a River I 
could not Control’: The Unintended Ordoliberal Consequences of the Eurozone Crisis”, (2015) 53 
Journal of Common Market Studies, pp. 1094-1109; for critical discussion, see Feld et al., note 2 above. 
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agendas.36 Also, it understates the influence of other brands of liberal-economic 
thought, particularly the Chicago-School neo-liberalism that has been a major 
influence on the ECB and branches of the Commission in recent decades. If 
anything, these ideas are more conducive to the politics of emergency, since 
they foresee large scope for executive discretion in the service of an agenda of 
“competitiveness”.37 There is a problem of over-determination, in other words, 
that should make us cautious in linking the EU’s crisis management too closely 
to one body of thought alone.38 
But one does not need to evoke unity of programme in this way, and attribute 
to it causal status, in order to concede the relevance of ordo-liberalism to recent 
EU decisions.39 The significance of this set of ideas, it can be said, lies rather in 
encouraging the avoidance or postponement of certain lines of action, in 
suggesting certain kinds of justification for actions once undertaken, and in 
prompting limited resistance to such manoeuvres from others (be they 
parliamentary figures in the political mainstream or opinion leaders in the 
media). Ordo-liberalism establishes a sensibility, possibly largely tacit, for 
certain kinds of response. If the EU’s politics of emergency in this period has 
sources well beyond the influence of one ideological tradition, it remains 
possible that, at least in this sense, ordo-liberalism was an enabling factor. 
Importantly, and as I have tried to argue, it is not plausible to discount the 
influence of ordo-liberalism simply by observing that the Euro crisis has been 
as much about acts of executive discretion as about the constraining force of 
                                                 
 36 See the IMF and ECB as two agents whose actions are hard to subsume under the ordo-liberal label. 37 See, for example, William Davies, The Limits of Neoliberalism: Authority, Sovereignty and the Logic 
of Competition, (London: Sage Publications, 2014). 38 Though, on this, see Biebricher, “Europe and the Political Philosophy of Neoliberalism”, note 3 
above, and, idem, “The Return of Ordoliberalism in Europe − Notes on a Research Agenda”, (2014) 9 I-lex, pp. 1-24. 39 I take some inspiration here from Quentin Skinner, “Moral Principles and Social Change”, in: idem, Visions of Politics Vol I: Regarding Method, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002). 
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binding rules. Certainly, the emphasis in the ordo-liberal tradition has always 
been on this latter aspect – on a system sufficiently structured by rules that it 
becomes “automatically functioning” – and the recurrent calls to strengthen the 
rules of the Eurozone are the features of the crisis period most in tune with the 
ordo-liberal outlook.40 The fact that the exercise of discretion has in no sense 
been banished from the emerging Eurozone regime41 is testament certainly to 
its imperfections from an ordo-liberal perspective. But the larger observation, I 
suggest, is that the very commitment to the idea of a stable and binding 
economic constitution has always implied the prospect of challenging 
situations being handled in far more discretionary fashion (in the service, of 
course, of strict rules), coupled with their framing as matters of high 
emergency. It is exactly the dialectical combination of rules and extraordinary 
discretion which is arguably characteristic of ordo-liberalism in its “actually 
existing” form. 
The distinctiveness of the EU setting, as a post-sovereign order, is that it makes 
this entwinement more pronounced and visible. Although at one level there 
would seem to be a special affinity between the ordo-liberal tradition and the 
transnational context – the voluntarily-embraced rules of an “economic 
constitution” promise to substitute for the absence of political hierarchy, and 
to establish order without popular interference – at the same time this context 
raises peculiar challenges for it. The disparity of economic conditions across the 
Eurozone makes the principle of limiting intervention to merely formal, rule-
based approaches more difficult than ever to sustain. The insistence for political 
reasons on territorialising ordo-liberal ideas of responsibility and liability, so 
that states become their carriers, 42  creates pressure for conditionality 
                                                 
 40 See Feld et al., note 2 above, p.10. 41 See Scharpf, note 1 above. 42 See Schäfer, note 35 above. 
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requirements and national vetoes that have more to do with discretion than 
rules. 43  The problem of contagion is more pronounced given the 
interdependence of Eurozone economies. The weakness of the EU as a 
constitutional order in the conventional sense means there are fewer legal 
constraints on what agents can do in the service of an “economic constitution”. 
The lack of a dominant political agent able to exercise uncontested authority, 
in the manner of the government of a nation-state, means that the exercise of 
political discretion can be especially chaotic, involving as it must the 
collaboration of multiple agents, and the appeal to the politics of emergency 
especially tempting as a means to galvanise action. All these are ways in which 
the combination of rules and extraordinary discretion becomes especially clear 
in the EU context; the combination itself though seems a characteristic 
implication of the ordo-liberal standpoint. 
The discretionary handling of legal and political norms – of sovereignty, 
democracy and others – in the name of strict policy rules: if this is what one 
witnesses today, then arguably it is the inverse of how many would want 
things to be. Instead of constitutional discretion to entrench a certain set of 
policies, a strong constitutional order that enables the orderly contestation of 
policies is arguably a preferable arrangement, certainly more in keeping with 
ideals of collective self-determination. Rather than aiming to reduce political 
discretion to the bare minimum, with all the potential for extraordinary action 
that this entails, there would seem to be no substitute for establishing the 
institutional structures that enable it to take legitimate form, as the considered 
                                                 
 43 On the asymmetric bargaining and threat of force involved, see Scharpf, note 1 above; Damian 
Chalmers, “Crisis Reconfiguration of the European Constitutional State”, in: Damian Chalmers, Markus Jachtenfuchs and Christian Joerges (eds), The End of the Eurocrats’ Dream: Adjusting to 
European Diversity, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2016); Magnus Ryner, “Europe’s 
Ordoliberal Iron Cage: Critical Political Economy, the Euro Area Crisis and its Management”, (2015) 22 Journal of European Public Policy, pp. 275-94; and Woodruff, note 22 above. 
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interventions of agents responsive to contending opinion rather than as the 
last-minute improvisations of technocratic élites. 
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